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IN THE SUPRE.ME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LOA JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
ELIZABETH F. SYME, Adminis-
tratrix of the Estate of Bailey Syme, 
Deceased, 




STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The action giving rise to this appeal arose out of an 
automobile collision occurring on October 8, 1954, at the 
hour of 11 :00 P.M., at 13800 South State Street, said 
South State Street being designated as U. S. Highway 
91. At the point of collision a ro.ad, 13800 South, known 
as the South Draper road, intersects with U.S. Highway 
91. At this point Highway 91 is a four lane divided high-
way, being 2 lanes for northbound traffic and 2 lanes for 
southbound traffic. The 2 inside lanes of Highway 91 
are each 16 feet wide. The two outside lane'S of Highw.ay 
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91 are each 24 feet wide. The dividing island or area 
between the lanes for northbound and southbound traffic 
is 35 feet wide, for a total highway width at this point 
of 115 feet. The South Draper road runs in an easterly 
direction from its intersection with U.S. Highway 91 to 
the vicinity of Draper, Utah. The South Draper road 
does not continue west of "C .S. Highway 91 as a public 
highway, but makes a T intersection with U.S. Highway 
91. A private road extends west from Highway 91 in a 
direct continuing line with the South Draper road and 
is a private road maintained by the Utah State Prison 
as a patrol road. Neither Highway 91 nor the South 
Draper road are artificially lighted in the area of this 
intersection. Approximately 600 feet south of the inter-
section and on the east side of U.S. High·way 91 is a sign 
one foot high and 3 feet high with the word "Draper" and 
a small arrow pointing to the east. This was the only 
sign or 1narker indicating to northbound traffic on High-
way 91, the imminence of the intersection of the south 
Draper road. Westbound traffic on the South Draper 
road is controlled by a conventional stop sign located on 
the north side of the South Draper road and approxi-
lnat.ely 30 feet east of the edge of r .S. Highway 91. 
The spe,ed limit along U.S. Highway 91 at the scene 
of the accident is and was 50 1niles per hour. The stated 
speed limit along the South Draper road is and was 35 
Tniles per hour. The plaintiff and appellant, Loa John-
son, was driving a 1953 Buick Hoadnwster sedan north 
along l T.S. I I ighway 91. The decedent, Bailey Syme, ·was 
driving a 1953 Ford sedan west along the South Draper 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
road. The two autornobiles collided at the intersection 
of the ro.ads, the collision resulting in the death of Mr. 
Syme and in personal injuries to the appellant, Mrs. 
Johnson. 
The appellant herein, Loa Johnson, thereafter com-
menced an action for personal injury against the re-
spondent herein as Administratrix of the estate of the 
decedent. The plaintiff in her complaint .alleged two 
causes of action, the first cause of ac;tion alleging that 
her injuries were a proximate result of the negligence 
of the decedent. The plaintiff's second cause of action 
alleged that her injuries were a proximate result of the 
wilful .and wanton misconduct of the decedent. The de.-
fendant's answer denied the negligence of the decedent, 
alleged the contributory negligence of the plaintiff and 
appellant herein as a defense and also made counter-
claim for damages resulting from the death of the 
decedent. 
The contpl.aint and counterclaim were sert: for jury 
trial and on M·ay 5, 1956, a pretrial hearing was held 
before the Honorable A. H. Ellett. 
In the course of the pretrial proceedings, it was ad-
mitted by respective counsel that if the police officer 
who investigated the accident, Highway Patrolman 
Seddon, were called as a witness that he would testify 
that he found the body of the decedent upon Highway 91 
approximately 80 feet in a northwesterly direction from 
the point of impaet from the two vehicles, and that the 
decedent's body .at that time carried an odor of alcoholie 
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beverage. In the course of the pretrial proceedings 
counsel for the plaintiff stated that he intended to call 
as witnesses the following: 
1. .Mr. 0. F. St,anley of Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Plaintiff's counsel stated that :.Mr. Stanley would testify 
that at about 11:00 o'clock P.M. on October 8, 1954, he 
was a passenger in a car driven by Harry Jones travel-
ing north on l!.S. Highway 91 near the Utah State Prison 
at the point of the rnountain, and that he sat in the center 
of the front seat of Mr. Jones' automobile. That he would 
testify that he was traveling at about 50 miles per hour 
and that as he neared the Draper road he noticed the 
head lights of a car which was westbound. Further, that 
i\Ir. Stanley would testify that he was about three-fourths 
of a block away from the intersection when he first saw 
the westbound car. That he would estimate the speed 
of the westbound ear in the neighborhood of 40 miles per 
hour and was about 300 feet of the intersection when he 
was first seen by :Mr. Stanley. That the westbound car 
continued through the intersection without stopping for 
the stop sign and collided with another northbound car. 
~Ir. Stanley would testify that he had not seen the north-
bound car until after the impact. 
2. ~fr. Marvin Taylor of S.alt Lake City, Utah. 
Cotmsel for the plaintiff stated that ~Ir. Taylor would 
testify that he was occupying the aut01nobile of ~Ir. 
If arr~T \V. Jones and was sitting on the right side of the 
front se~at, beside ~r r. Stanley. That they were traveling 
a.pproxinmtcly 50 1niles per hour and were staying ap-
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proximately a block behind another northbound ear which 
was proceeding at approximately the smne speed as the 
car in which he was riding. That as they were traveling 
north on F.S. Highway 91 ne.ar the State Prison ~fr. 
Stanley who was sitting to the left of Mr. Taylor sudden-
ly called the attention of the people in the Jones' auto-
mobile to a westbound car on a side road. That the 
westbound car was almost to the intersection when Mr. 
Taylor first observed it. That l\1r. Taylor obseTved the 
automobile come through the stop sign without stopping 
or slowing down .and saw the westbound automobile col-
lide with the northbound automobile which was ahead of 
l\1r. Jones' automobile. r_rhat Mr. 1Taylor would testify 
that he could not estimate the spe.ed of the westbound 
car but that he did observe that the westbound car did 
not stop or slow down for the stop sign. 
3. Harry W. Jones of Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Plaintiff's counsel stated Jones was driving his auto-
mobile north on U.S. Highway 91 near the Utah State 
Prison and that :Mr. 0. F. Stanley and Mr. ~farvin 
Taylor weTe sitting in the front seat beside him. That he 
was traveling about 45 miles per hour in the outside lane 
of northbound traffic .and that he noticed the tail lights 
on a car approximately a block in front of him which 
he would estiinate was traveling at approximately the 
same speed as his own automobile. That he suddenly 
observed a grey ear swinging around in ,a circle and that 
he had not observed the westbound automobile until he 
saw a cloud of dust and the car swinging around. That 
Mr. Jones would testify that he did not actually remem-
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ber seeing the impact and was not sure of details because 
he was very intenJt on his driving. At this time it was 
admitted and agreed by respective counsel that the testi-
Inony of the witnesses as proposed by the plaintiff's 
counsel could not be contradicted at that time by any 
other wirtnesses known to the defendant. (Pretrial Trans. 
Page 3, line 28, to Page 5, line 5, incl.) At this stage of 
the pretrial hearing the counsel for the plaintiff moved 
that the counterclaim of the defendant be dismissed on 
the grounds that all of the evidence would indicate that 
the decedent had been negligent as a matter of law and 
that such negligence had been the cause or in any event 
had contributed to his death. This motion to dismiss was 
granted by the cour.t. 
Thereupon on motion of counsel for the defendant, 
the deposition of the plaintiff, the appellant herein, ,,~as 
published. The testimony of the plaintiff as it appeared 
in the deposition disclosed that she had been visiting 
friends in Provo, li tah, and had left there about 10 :30 
or quarter to 11:00 (Page 9, line 6). That she proceeded 
north on U.S. Highway 91 from Provo to Salt Lake (Page 
9) that at the time of the collision it had been raining but 
had stopped and that the roads were wet (Page 10, lines 
3, 4, 5) ; that she was watching the road straight ahead 
with her lights on diln because of approaching traffic 
(Page 12line 25) when she saw the automobile belonging 
to the deeedent. When asked how far she was from the 
decedent's automobile when she first saw him, she first 
::;tated (Page 13, line 16) : 
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"A. vVell I can't judge on feet; I couldn't tell 
you; how many feet would your dim lightf: 
show~ 
Q. vVell, let's say, this how about car lengths? 
A car is pretty close to 20 feet long, 18 to 20 
feet. 
A. Well it was 20 to 30 feet I guess before I seen 
him. 
Q. You would estimate then that it would be a 
little bit more than one car length and less 
than two car lengths~ 
A. Oh I think it would be probably, yes, about 
that.'' 
The plaintiff further stated that she estimated the speed 
of the defendant at the time she first saw hirn as ten or 
twenty miles per hour (Page 14, line 24). The plaintiff 
further testified that the first time she saw the decedent's 
automobile was when her car lights firs1t picked it up 
on the road (Page 16, line 13) and that prior to that 
time she was watching the road str.aight ahead of her 
(Page 16, line 18; page 17, line 9 and 10; page 17, line 
19 and 20, 21 and 22). The plaintiff testified that lin-
mediately from the time she had left Provo to the point 
of the collision she had been traveling at approximately 
50 miles per hour and not to exceed 55 (Page 11, line 
6 and 7). 
Thereupon counsel for the defendant moved to dis-
miss the complaint of the plaintiff on the basis of the 
proposed testimony and on the basis of the te,stimony of 
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the plaintiff as appeared by her deposition. The court 
thereupon ruled: 
1. That the eonduct of the plaintiff constituted 
negligence as a matter of law. 
2. That the negligence of the plaintiff contributed 
as a matter of law to the proximate cause of her injuries, 
and 
3. That the evidence proposed by the plaintiff was 
insufficient as a matter of law to raise a question of fact 
for the jury as to any wilful and wanton misconduct on 
the part of the decedent. The court thereupon dismissed 
the first and second causes of action of the plaintiff's 
complaint. 
From the findings of the court, first, that plaintiff 
was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, 
second, that such contributory negligence was a proxi-
mate cause of her injuries as a matter of law and, third, 
that the evidence proposed by the plaintiff w.as insuffi-
cient as a matter of law to raise a question of fact for 
the jury as to any wilful and wanton misconduct on the 
part of the decedent and from the consequent dismissal 
of plaintiff's first and second causes of action, the plain-
tiff takes this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 
CONDUCT OF THE PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT ·CON-
STITUTED NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
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POINT II 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN ITS HOLDING THAT 
THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT 
CONTRIBUTED AS A MATTER OF LAW TO THE PROXI-
MATE CAUSE OF HER INJURIES. 
POINT III 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN ITS RULING THAT THE 
EVIDENCE PROPOSED BY THE PLAINTIFF AND APPEL-
LANT WAS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW TO 
RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT FOR THE JURY AS TO ANY 




THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 
CONDUCT OF THE PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT ·CON-
STITUTED NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
The court indicated in the pre-trial proceeding's that 
his finding that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory 
negligence as a n1atter of law was based on the fact that 
the plaintiff did not see the defendant until immediately 
before the cvash (Pretrial Tr., Page 6, lines 5 to 8). 
This court has heretofore held that the questions of 
negligence in failing to observe an approaching automo-
bile at an intersection is one of fact for the jury. In the 
case of Hess v. Robinson, 163 Pac. 2nd 510, 109 Utah 60, 
a case involving a fact situation almost identical to the 
instant case, this court stated at Page 512: 
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"As to what the circumstances were at the 
time the plaintiff entered the intersection, and as 
to whether entering under such circumstances was 
an act from which persons of ordinary prudence 
and caution would have foreseen some injury 
would likely result, are matters upon which 
reasonable minds may differ. As such they are 
properly for the jury." 
Discussing the failure of the plaintiff to observe the ap-
proach of the defendant's vehicle, the court stated at 
Page 512: 
"But does it follow as beyond dispute that had 
the plaintiff looked and seen the ambulance ap-
proaching, reasonable and prudent conduct would 
have dictated ·that he stop until the ambulance 
had crossed the intersection. Are the facts re-
vealed by the evidence so clear and certain that 
the court could say that for plaintiff to drive into 
the intersection without stopping was not the act 
of an ordinarily prudent and careful man." 
In the case of Jlat·fin v. Sterens, 243 Pac. 2nd 747, a 
case in which the plaintiff entered an open intersection 
at 18th East and Stratford Streets in Salt Lake City, the 
plaintiff entering the intersection from the north along 
18th East Street and the defendant proceeding west 
along Stratford A venue, the trial court held that the 
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a 1natter 
of law in failing to observe the defendant's automobile 
in time to avoid the eollision. This court, in discussing 
the duty of the plaintiff to exercise due care, states at 
Page 750: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
"But in doing so he had the right to assume, 
and to rely on the assumption that others would 
do likewise." 
The court holding the defendant's negligence to be a 
question of fact for the jury, reversed the decision of the 
trial court and remanded the cause for trial. See also 
S1Jackman v. Carson, 216 Pac. 2nd 640: 
"Unless all reasonable minds must say that 
a party did not use due care under a particular 
set of eircumstaces, it is a question for the jury." 
In this case the plaintiff driving ,a motorcycle on a 
country road at approximately 45 miles an hour observed 
the defendant's truck parked on the side of the road ap-
proximately 200 feet ahead of him. His testimony was 
that he next saw the truck pulling in front of him when 
he was approximately 30 feet away, that he ,applied his 
brakes and was unable to avoid the collision. The court 
observing that the plaintiff had not been alerted to any 
immediate danger by his first observation of the truck 
and there being no indication to the plaintiff that it was 
about to be moved into his path observes at Page 642: 
"Under these circumstances we are convinced 
that the issue of whether the p}aintiff was negli-
gent in failing to keep a more diligent lookout 
ahead was properly submit,ted to the jury." 
It is the contention of the appellant that her position 
immediately preceding the collision was identical to that 
of the plaintiff in the Spackman case, in that had she 
observed the decedent's automobile a;t any time prior to 
his entering the intersection she would have had no indi-
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cation that the decedent was about to proceed through the 
stop sign without slowing down or stopping. 
The further issue of the plaintiff's speed at the time 
of the collision was also raised as an issue by the coun-
sel for defendant at the pretrial hearing (Pretrial Trans-
cript, Page 2, lines 13 to 17 inclusive). However, the trial 
court made no indication that its ruling was b.ased in any 
way on the plaintiff's rate of speed. In any event, the 
speed of the plaintiff at the time of the collision was 
never stated by her in her deposition nor was this ques-
tion asked her by defendant's counsel. The only refer-
ence to her speed in the deposition was in answer to the 
question (deposition, p.age 11, line 4) : 
"Q. About how fast had you been traveling from 
the time you left Provo ~ 
A. Oh approxinl'ately 50, or-to my knowledge, 
it was between 50, and-I don't think I got 
ove·r 55." 
The only evidence proposed as to speed at the pre-
trial hearing was the proposed testi1nony of ~Ir. ~Iarvin 
Taylor, a passenger in the car following the plaintiff's 
automobile, whose proposed testimony would indicate 
that he was in an auton1obile traveling approximately 
50 miles per hour, and that the car in front of them (the 
plaintiff) was traveling at approxi1nately the same speed, 
and the proposed testnnony of l\Ir. Harry \V. Jones, who 
was the driver of the auton1obile following the plaintiff 
and in which 1\la.rvin Taylor was a passenger, whose 
proposed te~timony \Yonld indicate his speed to be about 
45 miles per hour, and that the rar in front of him, the 
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plaintiff, was traveling at approximately the same speed. 
rrherefore the appellant submits that there is no evidence 
of excessive speed, or at the most a possible question of 
fact for a jury. See 5 American Jur. 882, Sec. 689, where 
it is stated: 
" . . it is generally for the jury to decide 
whether ... such speed was excessive, considering 
in connection therewith the hazards of the sur-
rounding circumstances.'' 
See also, Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile Law & 
Practice, Part 2, Page 111, Seetion 2611, reading as 
follows: 
"It is usually a question for the jury whether 
an excessive rate of speed is a contributing cause 
of an accident. ... " 
:See also the case of Poulsen v. Manness, 241 Pac. 2nd 
152, wherein this court held that the issue of contributory 
negligence on the part of the plaintiff was properly sub-
mitted to the jury. 
Appellant respectfully submits that ther.e is no evi-
dence in the proceedings had in the pretrial hearing 
before the trial court in this matter which will support 
the ruling of the trial court that the plaintiff and appel-
lant herein was guilty of contributory negligence as ,a 
matter of law. 
POINT II 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN ITS HOLDING THA'T 
THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT 
CONTRIBUTED AS A MATTER OF LAW TO THE PROXI-
MATE CAUSE OF HER INJURIES. 
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ARGUMENT 
Assuming for the purpose of this argument that the 
plaintiff and appellant is guilty of contributory negli-
gence as a matter of law in failing to see the approach 
of the decedent's automobile and in traveling at an ex-
cessive speed, it is the position of the plaintiff and appel-
lant that in this event the question as to whether such 
negligence was a proximate cause of the accident and of 
the consequent injuries to the appellant is properly a 
question of fact for the jury. 
In the case of Hess v. Robinson, 163 Pac. 2nd 510, 
109 U t.ah 60, the plaintiff was traveling on a through 
street and was struck by the defendant's automobile when 
the defendant ran a stop sign. The facts of the Hess 
case are almost identical with the facts of the instant 
case in that both cases the respective plaintiffs failed to 
see the defendant vehicle approaching the stop sign. In 
the Hess 0ase this court held that, even assun1ing the 
negligence on the part of the plaintiff, the question of 
proximate cause was properly one for the jury. Quoting 
the opinion of the court at Page 512: 
"But does it follow as beyond dispute that 
had the plaintiff looked and seen the ambulanc~ 
approaching, reasonable and prudent conduct 
would have dictated that he stop until the ambu-
lance had crossed the intersection. Are the facts 
revealed by the evidence so clear and certain that 
the court oould sa~~ that for plaintiff to drive into 
the intersection without stopping was not the act 
of .an ordinarii~· prudent and careful n1an.'· 
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[n the case of lvlartin L'. Stevens, 243 Pac. 2nd 747, 
involving a collision of two automobiles at an uncon-
trolled intersection, after discussing the proposition that 
the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a 
matter of law and after determining that he was not, the 
court stated at Page 753: 
"There is also the question of proximate 
cause. Should we assume that all reasonable men 
must conclude that plaintiff's failure to keep more 
of a lookout to the east amounted to negligence, 
would they .also all agree that such failure to ob-
serve proximately caused the collision. Suppose 
he had looked continuously to the east as he ap-
proached and proceeded into the intersection and 
had seen defendant coming. Could he not, within 
the limits of reasonable care, have assumed de-
fendant would slow up and yield the right of w:ay, 
or would the defendant's speed and proximity to 
the intersection have been a warning to the plain-
tiff that he would nort do so. Under the rulings in 
Hess v. Robinson, Lowder v. Holley, and Poulsen 
v. Manness, this was also a jury question." 
See also Lowder v. Holley, 233 Pac. 2nd 350. 
See also Poulsen v. ~Ianness, 241 Pac. 2nd 152, 
wherein this court ruling that the issues of negligence 
and proximate cause were properly for the jury s~tated: 
"Another way of stating it is that a motorist 
driving on a fast arte·ri.al highway need not treat 
every country lane or relatively minor side road 
as an interseetion. He has the right of way for a 
much gre,ater distance." 
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See also 5 A1nerican Jurisprudence, Page 882, See-
tion 689, wherein the court stated: 
" ... it is generally for the jury to decide 
whether the speed of the vehicle proximately con-
tributed to the accident. . . . " 
See also 10 Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile 
Law & P~actice, Part I, Page 662, Section 6607, where 
it is stated : 
''Speed in excess of that permitted by statute, 
ordinance, or other traffic regulation may con-
stitute negligence per se; nevertheless there is 
still a jury question as to whether or not such vio-
lation was the proximate cause of the injury or 
damage complained of." 
Appellant submits that under all of the facts and 
circumstances shown or indicated in the pretrial proceed-
ings in this cause, that the question of the proximate 
cause or causes of the collision of the appellant's auto-
mobile with that of the decedent is properly a question 
of fact to be detennined by the jury. 
POINT III 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN ITS RULING THAT THE 
EVIDENCE PROPOSED BY THE PLAINTIFF AND APPEL-
LANT WAS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW TO 
RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT FOR THE JURY AS TO ANY 
WILFUL AND WANTON MISCONDUCT ON THE PART OF 
THE DECEDENT. 
The evidence of the plaintiff as proposed at the 
pre,trial hearing, if sub1nitted to a jury, would support 
a finding h)' the jury that the decedent approached an 
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arterial highway along a small side road at a speed of 
about 40 1nile,s per hour, and that the decedent drove 
directly through the stop sign and on to the highway 
without stopping or slowing down and directly into the 
path of the plaintiff. The jury might also find from the 
testimony of the investigating officer that the decedent 
had partaken of alcoholic beverages sometime prior to 
the collision. It is the contention of the appellant that 
should a jury so find, they might also find that such con-
duct on the part of the decedent constituted wilful and 
wanton misconduct and further that such wilful and 
wanton 1nisconduct was the proximate cause of the in-
juries to the plaintiff. 
The crime of reckless driving is defined at Utah 
Code Annortated 1953 Section 41-6-45(a) as follows: 
•'Any pHrson who drives any vehicle in wilful 
or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or 
property is guilty of reckless driving." 
~.,or the purpose of this argument, the appellant sub-
mits to the court a hypothetical situation identieal to the 
.actual situation in the instant case, except that we will 
ask the court to assume that 1\frs. Johnson, the plaintiff 
and appellant herein, had been killed as a result of the 
collision and that Bailey Syme, the decedent herein, had 
survived the collision and had been prosecuted for man-
slaughter. That this evidence, had it been presented 
against Bailey Syme, in the course of a prosecution for 
manslaughter, would sustain his conviction by a jury 
appears from the reasoning of this court in the following 
previous decisions. 
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In the case of State v. Lingman) 91 Pac. 2nd, 457, 97 
Utah 180, the defendant w.as convicted of the crime of 
involuntary mansl,aughter based on an automobile colli-
sion occurring September 29, 1937, at the intersection of 
21st South Street and 2nd West Street, when the defend-
ant's car going north on 2nd West Street collided with 
ear driven west on 21st South Street, by the decedent. 
The defendant was charged at driving at .a speed in ex-
cess of 40 miles an hour which speed was dangerous and 
excessive in view of the width and obstructions of the 
said driver's view along the said highway and the hazard 
of the inte·rsection hereinbefore mentioned. The jury 
was also instructed that failure to yield the right of way 
could be the unlawful act not amounting to a felony to 
support the conviction. Because of an erroneous instruc-
tion by the court with reference to a municipal speed 
ordinance the cause was remanded for new trial, the court 
holding that under proper instruction the evidence was 
sufficient to raise .a question for the jury. The court 
states at Page 198: 
"We think the unlawful ac.t that is the infrac-
tion must be done in such a Inanner as to more 
than constitute a 1nere thoughtless omission or 
slight deviation from the norm of prudent con-
duct. It must be reckless or in 1narked disregard 
to the s:afety of others. When it does that it 
passes the stage of nwre 1nalum prohibitum and 
approaches the unsocial aspects of n1alum in se." 
Again quoting fr01n Page 200 : 
" ... A.nd if such act totally prohibited is done 
recklessly or with Inarked disregard for the safety 
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of others, it will be done with criminal negligence 
and if dea:th results will sustain a charge of man-
slaughter under arm A." 
Again quoting from Page 201 : 
"Paradoxically the lawful act of driving in .an 
unlawful manner is an unlawful act, hence if done 
with recklessne.ss or with marked disregard for 
the safety of others, it may as well be considered 
as falling under arm A and of course if the .act 
is fraught with danger to life and done in an un-
lawful manner, it could hardly be nther than done 
recklessly." Arm A being "An unlawful act not 
amounting to a felony." 
Quoting from page 204 : 
"In consequence the instruction of the court 
on this question in this case may be substantially 
as follows: If the jury finds that Mrs. Layton was 
killed by the impacl and that the impact was 
caused by the driving of the defendant in a reck-
less 1nanner or for marked disregard for the 
safety of o·thers, as charged in the information, 
then such driving being unlawful and in violation 
of the provisions of Title 57 as set out, would 
sustain a conviclion of manslaughter." 
In ·this case there was no evidence of intoxicrution on the 
part of the defendant. 
The case of the State· v. Lingman w.as cited and 
approved in the case of State v. Barker, 196 Pac. 2nd, 
723, 113 Utah 514. In this case the defendant was found 
guilty of involuntary manslaughter re·sulting from an 
automobile collision at 33rd South .and 23rd East Streets, 
Salt Lake County. The defendant was driving north on 
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23rd East Street and the decedent was riding in another 
automobile traveling east on 33rd South Street. 33rd 
South Street is a through highway and there are stop 
signs against the traffic entering 33rd South from the 
north and south on 23rd East Street. The evidence in-
dicated that the defendant saw the stop sign when he was 
75 to 100 yards from it, and at that time he was traveling 
from 30 to 35 miles per hour. He testified that he slowed 
his car nearly to a stop and shifted into an intermediate 
gear and began to pick up speed when he came even with 
the stop sign. He then stated that he saw the lights of 
the other car approaching from the west and applied 
his brakes but was unable to stop. On appeal the defend-
ant contended that the evidence was not sufficient to 
sustain the conviction and second that the court had 
committed prejudicial error in instructing the jury. The 
court, holding that certain instructions had been erron-
eous, remanded the cause for a new trial. The court in 
denying the .argument of the defendant that the evi-
dence was insufficient to sustain a eonviction stated as 
follows at Page 526: 
"The faet that he (the defendant) entered 
this intersection at a time when another ear was 
approaching so near as to constitute an iimnedi-
ate hazard made it highly dangerous to the occu-
pants of that ear regardless of whether he came 
to a eomplete stop, or 1nerely slowed down or 
drove through without even slowing down .. , 
Again quoting: 
"If under these eircun1stanees his failure to 
yield was the result of inattention on his part or 
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because of his failure to observe and see in time 
that there was a car approaching on the inter-
secting highway, or if he saw the approaching car 
in time to yield the right of way and failed to do 
so, then the jury from those f.aets would be justi-
fied in finding that he was guilty of conduct which 
was reckless or in marked disregard for the 
safety of others. That inattention to the traffic 
and other persons on the highway which results in 
a driver's failure to avoid great danger and injury 
to others who are on the highway, has been re-
peatedly held by this court to constitute reckless-
ness and to justify a verdict of manslaughter." 
Quoting again: 
"The evidence was sufficient to justify the 
court in submitting the case to the jury, but on 
account of the erroneous instructions, the case is 
reversed and remanded for a new trial." 
In the case of State v. Anderson, 116 Pac. 2nd 398. 
The defendant Anderson was convicted of the crime of 
involuntary manslaughter arising out of an automobile 
collision at 21st South and 3rd East Streets in Salt Lake 
City. The defendant was proceeding northward on 3rd 
E.ast Street. The decedent was traveling westward on 
21st South Street, a through highway. On the southeast 
corner of the intersection and facing south was the usual 
state highway stop sign. The evidence was uncontro-
verted that the defendant did not stop at the stop sign. 
He stated he did not know there was a stop sign there 
until he saw it. That he applied his hr.akes and tried to 
stop, but skidded into the other car. The evidence was 
that the defendant entered the intersection at a speed 
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of between 40 and 45 miles an hour. The court, discuss-
ing the sufficiency of the evidence, stated at Page 401: 
"We need not enter into a discussion of these 
matters, it would add much detail to do so and 
might not be helpful. The instructions, objection-
able as they are, nevertheless covered the issues 
and the evidence. Under the evidence the jury was 
justified in finding the verdict of guilty." 
Appellant submits that if such evidence will support 
a conviction of involuntary manslaughter with the at-
tendant burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the same evidence will support a finding in a civil action 
and particularly in the instant case of wilful and wanton 
misconduct on the part of Bailey Syme. Each of the 
cases cited is almost identical to the conduct of the de-
cedent, Bailey Syme, in this case. That a jury might 
find the decedent herein acted recklessly would seem to 
follow. As stated by this court in the Lingman case: 
". . . and of course if the act is fraught with 
danger to life and done in an unlawful manner, it 
could hardly be other than done recklessly." 
From the statute defining reckless driving as driving 
with "wilful and wanton disregard for the safety of 
others" appellant sub1nits to the court that the conclu-
sion must follow that a jury in the case now before this 
court might well find in favor of the plaintiff and appel-
lant on her Second Cause of Action, and that such a find-
ing would properly be within the province of the finder 
of fact. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the order 
of the lower court dismissing plaintiff's First Cause of 
Action and the order of the lower court dismissing plain-
tiff's Second Cause of Aetion should each be reversed 
and that both causes of action of plaintiff's complaint 
should be remanded for jury trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LEE W. HOBBS 
Attorney for Appellant 
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